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1

I.

SUMMARY

The trial court abused its discretion by conducting the trial
on the one day it was certain that Schwartz could not attend.
Having been timely informed that Schwartz must be present on the
primary election day for the Massachusetts legislature, the trial
court refused to move the trial to a less inopportune time and
denied Schwartz the ability to assist his counsel and testify in
his own defense at the trial.
The trial court also ignored the express terms of an unambiguous condition precedent.

This error should be reviewed using a

correction of error standard because the intent of the parties may
be determined from the unambiguous words of the written agreement.
A clearly erroneous standard of review is not appropriate because
the trial court did not need to make findings of fact in order to
determine

the meaning

of

the

condition precedent.

No

legal

doctrine permits the trial court to ignore express written contract
terms because one party claims they are not material.
Finally, the trial court's error in reforming the contract
without finding a mistake of fact cannot be justified as a means
for the trial court to emphasize the term "sale".

An interpreta-

tion that the "sale" referred to in the express condition precedent
had occurred on May 2 0 would strip the condition of any meaning
because the parties agreed to the condition more than a month later
on June 2 5.

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim)

"I"

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Conducting the Trial
on the One Day it was Certain that Schwartz Could Not Attend.
1-

Schwartz's Attendance in Massachusetts was Required on
the Election Day.

The trial court conducted the trial on the election day that
Schwartz was a candidate in a special primary for the Massachusetts
Legislature.

Even Fehlauer agreed and acknowledged that the trial

setting on the election day was "inopportune."

Record at 64.

Fehlauer further suggested that the trial court could review the
trial

setting

in

light

of

the

future

results

of

Schwartz's

candidacy in Massachusetts with the possibility that the trial
could be held as late as July if Schwartz continued to win elections and indeed served as a representative in the Massachusetts
Legislature.

Record at 64.

Fehlauer thus recognized the necessity of a political candidate to be present in the election jurisdiction for the final
campaigning before an election, to vote in the election, and to be
present for the results of the election.

Schwartz's absence from

Massachusetts on the election day would have been devastating to
his campaign and would have breached the commitments he had made to
his supporters.
However,

Fehlauer

overstates

the

record

of

Schwartz's

responses to alternative trial dates discussed in two unrecorded
scheduling conferences held on March 28 and April 26, 1994.

These

conferences are described in a "Statement of Proceedings When No
Report Was Made," pursuant to Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellant

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim)
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Procedure.

Record at 210-213.

Addendum Tab 1.

Nowhere does the

record reflect that Schwartz stated he "would not set foot out of
Massachusetts until after the election" nor did he "lodge a veto
against the entire three-month period from March until July".
Instead, the record reflects that Schwartz made the trial court
aware of his candidacy and presented arguments and reasons why it
would be difficult for him to attend until after this commitment
was completed.

Further, Schwartz's counsel did

affirmatively

commit the availability of her client after the possibility of his
commitments were completed during July.

2.

Record at 231.

The Trial Court had Other Options for a Trial Date.

The trial court had multiple options available

to it in

choosing a trial date which would have been less prejudicial to
Schwartz.

The trial court could have followed the suggestion of

Fehlauer and set a trial date which would have allowed Schwartz to
fulfill his commitments subject to his continuing to win elections
and serve in the Massachusetts Legislature. For example, the trial
court could have set a trial date subsequent to the special primary
election on May 10 and if Schwartz won that election, which he did,
then the trial court could continue the trial until after the
general election.

If Schwartz won in the general election, then

the trial court could have set a trial date after the completion of
the legislative

session

in July.

Rather than following

this

procedure, the trial court conducted the trial on the one day it
was certain that Schwartz could not attend.

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim)
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Schwartz presented good reasons why the trial dates considered
were not appropriate.

However, none of these dates would have

absolutely prevented the attendance of Schwartz as did the May 10
date.
At the scheduling conference held on Monday, March 28, 1994
the court suggested the trial could be held seven days later on the
following Monday, April 4, 1994.

Record at 211.

Addendum Tab 1.

This date presented the obvious problem of a short notice to
prepare for trial, particularly for an out of state defendant who
must make travel arrangements.

It was also in the middle of

Schwartz's campaign.

His counsel justifiably did not voluntarily

accept

Similarly,

this

additional

date.

problems

because

of

the

date

Schwartz's

of

May

12

possible

presented
continuing

campaign in Massachusetts and the prior commitment of his counsel
to attend a Mandatory Continuing Legal Education event.
At the scheduling conference conducted on April 26, 1994, the
trial court had before it the knowledge that Schwartz's primary
election was the same day as the date set for trial on May 10,
1994.

The court also had Schwartz's motion to continue the trial

and Fehlauer's acknowledgement that the existing date of May 10,
1994 was "inopportune".

Record at 64. The trial court considered

other possible dates, all of which presented problems, but none of
which absolutely prevented Schwartz's attendance as did the May 10
date.
Schwartz argued why each of the proposed dates were inconvenient and prejudicial.

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ.B02 (aim)

Nevertheless, rather than choosing any of

-4-

these dates the trial court instead chose the one date which
Schwartz absolutely could not attend.

3.

The Trial Court had the Responsibility to Set a Trial
Date that Schwartz Could Attend.

In setting a trial date, the parties must argue why proposed
dates may not be reasonable in light of the circumstances.

While

an agreed trial date may be the preferred method, the trial court
still has the responsibility to set a reasonable date when the
parties cannot agree.
The

trial

court

in this case was not

able

to obtain a

voluntary agreement between Fehlauer and Schwartz, except for a
date after Schwartz completed his civic commitment to the Massachusetts Legislature.
obligated

to

circumstances.

set

a

Nevertheless, the trial court
trial

date

which

was

reasonable

remained
in

the

A date in the latter part of July would have

satisfied Schwartz's concerns and only marginally disadvantaged
Fehlauer's desire to begin immediate construction in the event
Fehlauer prevailed.

From all the dates discussed in the two

scheduling conferences, the trial court chose, and then refused to
continue, the one date that all parties knew Schwartz could not
attend.

Even Fehlauer agreed that this date was "inopportune."

The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to continue the
trial from this date.
In his opposition brief, Fehlauer

relies on cases which

discuss the trial court's discretion to continue trials for the
purpose of accommodating witnesses.

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWAR7Z B02 (aim)
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None of these cases address

the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in not
granting a continuance to allow a party to attend his own trial.
See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State
v. Oliver, 820 P. 2d 474, 476-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) . In the cited
type of case, the issue often becomes whether alternative means can
be used to produce evidence or whether the offered evidence would
materially prejudice the party if not presented at trial.

The

situation presented when a party is denied the opportunity to
attend his own trial is quite different.

The absence of a party at

his own trial to testify in his own defense and assist his counsel
far overshadows

the

absence

of

a piece

of

evidence

or of a

potential witness.
As the Supreme Court explained in Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah
2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378 (1962), a party has a significant right
to participate in the defense of an action pending against him.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it insisted that
the trial proceed on the one day all parties agreed would preclude
the participation of Schwartz.

B.

The Trial Court Interpreted an Unambiguous Condition Precedent
so as to Ignore its Express Terms.
1•

All Terms and Conditions of an Unambiguous Contract Must
be Given Effect.

Fehlauer's complaint presented the trial court with the enforcement of the following express written condition precedent:
Subject to sale of house & property at 841 S.W. Hoytsville Road, Coalville on or before July 6, 1993.

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim)
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The Utah Supreme Court has long held that if a contract is in
writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the
parties

must

be

determined

from

the words

Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108

of

the agreement.

(Utah 1991) citing

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat 7 !. Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
A court may only consider extrinsic evidence, if after careful
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain.

A

contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms,
missing terms, or facial deficiencies".

Faulkner v. Farnsworth,

665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).
The condition quoted above is not ambiguous because it is not
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.

None of the

terms have uncertain meanings, no terms are missing and no facial
deficiencies exist.

The parties have specifically identified the

property that must be sold by address and specifically stated the
date by which it must be sold.1
Furthermore, the trial court made no conclusion that the
condition contained any ambiguity or uncertainty.

Even if the

trial court had made such a conclusion, it would have been an error
lr

The interpretation that Fehlauer argues for the first time in
his Appellee's Brief, concerning the meaning of the term "sale", is
addressed more fully in Section I.e. of this Reply Brief.
No
uncertainty could have existed as to whether the term "sale" meant
"entry into a contract" or "final closing" because by the time
Schwartz entered the contract with Fehlauer on June 25, the contract of sale with the Madsen's had been entered more than a month
earlier on May 20. To interpret the term "sale" as meaning May 20,
the date of the contract with Madsen, would strip the condition
precedent of any meaning whatsoever because the "sale" would have
already occurred by the time Fehlauer agreed to the condition on
June 2 5.
S\5CHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ.B02 (aim)
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of law, and may have been reviewed on appeal for correction of
error.

Id. at 1293. Alf v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 850

P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993).
The trial court interpreted an unambiguous contract and the
Court of Appeals may review such conclusions for correctness with
no particular deference given to the trial court's ruling.

State

v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d
198, 199-200 (Utah 1991).

The clearly erroneous standard of review

is not appropriate because extrinsic evidence is not required to
determine the parties' intent.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a
court must determine the parties' intent from the document itself,
giving effect to all terms of the contract.
The basic rule of contract interpretation is that the
intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the
content of the instrument itself. . . . Each contract
provision is to be considered in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and
ignoring none.
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 8 02
P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) quoting Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636
P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981) . See also LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life
Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858

(Utah 1988) .

(Contract should be

interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its
terms.)
the

The court must apply a plain meaning rule which preserves

intent

of

the parties

judicial revision.

and protects

contract

against

See, Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc.,

657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ.B02 (aim)

the

-8-

The trial court, in stating its three alternative grounds for
excusing the express condition precedent either ignores the plain
meaning of the written word or expressly revises the words so as to
excuse the July 6 deadline by which the adjacent Madsen property
must have been sold.

Under well recognized principles of contract

interpretation, the trial court was required to give effect to all
terms of the condition and had no authority to ignore or revise
them.

2.

The Trial Court Cannot Ignore Contract Terms Which One
Party Claims are not Material.

The trial court concluded in Conclusions of Law No. 1 and 2
that it could consider extrinsic or parole evidence in analyzing
the materiality
performance case.

of

a contract

term

Record at 171-72.

especially

in a

specific

However, Fehlauer has cited

no authority for this legal conclusion.

Indeed, if such authority

existed, it would run counter to the established rules of contract
interpretation and permit virtually every contract term to be
challenged because one party did not consider the term to be
material.
The trial court may have confused the concept of strict compliance with a condition precedent and the concept of substantial
compliance with a contract

covenant.

The case of Brown-Marx

Associates, Ltd. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 703 F.2d 1361 (11th Cir.
1983) illustrates this distinction.
sued

a bank

commitment.

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim)

alleging

breach

of

A prospective borrower had

a contract

to

close

a

loan

The bank defended on the grounds that the commitment

-9-

was conditioned upon the borrower obtaining leases of not less than
$714,447.00 per annum.

The borrower only obtained leases in the

amount of $706,186.00.

Id. at 1366, Fn.4.

The borrower argued

that he had substantially complied with the condition.

The court

noted:
The substantial performance doctrine provides that where
a contract is made for an agreed exchange of two
performances, one of which is to be rendered first,
substantial performance rather than exact, strict or
literal performance by the first party of the terms of
the contract is adequate to entitle the party to recover
on it. . . .
The doctrine is not primarily concerned with substantial
performance of a "condition" but rather with substantial
performance by one party of his obligations arising out
of the agreed exchange under the contract.
Id. at 1367.
The court then held that the substantial performance doctrine had
no application to the minimum annual rent requirement imposed by
the express condition precedent in the commitment.

Since the

condition had not been satisfied, the court could not enforce the
commitment.
Even if the trial court had properly considered evidence of
whether the July 6 provision in the express condition precedent was
material,

the

evidence

that

Schwartz

attached

no

particular

significance to the date does not mean that the parties intended no
date to apply.

The undisputed facts established that Schwartz

proposed the specific date of July 6 and Fehlauer accepted it.
Record at 319. The parties established a certain date beyond which
Schwartz would be free of his obligation to sell the property.

A

specific choice of dates between July 1, July 6 or July 10 may not

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ.B02 (aim)
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have been significant, but a definite date was important.

Having

chosen the date, and the condition having failed to occur prior to
the date, Schwartz was entitled to the benefit of his bargain and
to be relieved from the obligation to convey the property to
Fehlauer.
The trial court improperly concluded that it could analyze the
materiality of a contract term with extrinsic and parol evidence.
No legal principle allows the court to ignore a contract term
because one party may not consider it material.

All terms must be

given effect and an express condition precedent must be satisfied
by strict performance.

3.

An Express Condition Precedent does not Require a "Time
is of the Essence" Provision in Order for a Deadline to
be Enforced.

Because an express condition precedent containing a deadline
expressly avoids a contract if the stated event does not occur
before the dated stated, a separate term stating that "time is of
the essence" is not necessary.

Renovest Co. v. Hodges Dev. Corp.,

600 A.2d 448 (N.H. 1991); Barnes v. Euster, 214 A.2d 807, 809 (Md.
Ct. App. 1965); Clarke v. Lacy, 132 A.2d 478, 483 (Md. Ct. App.
1957).
The Utah

Supreme

Court

has recognized

this principle

Braithwaite v. Sorensen, 561 P.2d 1083 (Utah 1977).

in

As described

in Schwartz's opening brief, the parties in Braithwaite had made
performance of a real estate purchase contract dependent upon the
release of a federal tax lien within three years. The Utah Supreme
Court noted:
S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim)

- 1 1

-

Under the express terms of the contract, a condition
precedent to performance was a release of the tax lien.
If this contingency did not occur in three years, the
escrow agent would redeliver the money and papers, and
the parties would be released of all obligations under
the contract.
Id. at 1084.
The Braithwaite Court held that the obligations were extinguished
after the deadline expired even though the buyers had provided a
mechanism for releasing the lien.

The Court thus recognized the

significance of a time deadline stated in an express condition.
Some courts have compared a condition with a deadline to an
option.

Options

contracts,

are

requiring

considered

full performance

obligation to perform arises.
essence is a matter of law."
(Md. Ct. App. 1957).

and

construed

as

unilateral

by one party before

In such cases

an

"time is of the

Clarke v. Lacy, 132 A.2d 478, 483

An option deadline would be of little value

if it could be exercised at any reasonable time.
The decision in Barker v. Francis, 741 P. 2d 548, 552 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) is entirely consistent with the common law rules stated
above.

The Utah Court of Appeals did not enforce a stated closing

date because the contract
essence" provision.

did not include a

"time

is of the

However, the Barker court was not considering

a condition with a deadline. Rather, it was considering a covenant
to close by a certain date. Covenants may require an express "time
is of the essence" provision; conditions do not.
Similarly, Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d

1124

(Utah 1977) and

Century 21 All Western Real Estate and Inv. , Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d
52 (Utah 1982) both involved issues of whether a party had timely

S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ.B02 (aim)
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performed covenants in contracts which did not contain declarations
that "time is of the essence". Neither of these cases involved the
issue of whether a condition had been satisfied.

560 P.2d at 1126

("the agreement did not provide for any forfeiture or avoidance of
the contract if the closing did not occur on the stated date") ; 645
P.2d at 55 ("where the executory contract contains no declaration
that time is of the essence, the contract obligations can continue
for some time beyond the agreed closing date").
The court in Renovest noted that conditions must be treated
differently from covenants.

The parties' expectation of strict

compliance with the condition should be given effect.
[W]hen the parties expressly condition their performance
upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event, rather
than simply including the event as one of the general
terms of the contract, the parties' bargained-for
expectation of strict compliance should be given effect.
600 A.2d at 452-53 (emphasis added).
The two cases cited by Fehlauer as supporting

the trial

court's conclusions involve different issues which are not relevant
to deciding this case.

In Honevman v. Clostermann, 753 P.2d 1384

(Or. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Baugh v. Bryant
Ltd. Partnerships I Through XV, 803 P.2d 742 (Or. Ct. App. 1990),
the trial court was presented with an ambiguous earnest money
agreement.

The agreement contained a closing date in the "time is

of the essence" clause which directly conflicted with a "special
condition" that the sale close within five days of satisfaction of
a buildability contingency.

These provisions presented a conflict

as to when the buyer was obligated to close.

The court resolved

the conflict by interpreting the contract so that the closing date
S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim)

-13-

in the "time is of the essence" clause was a "target date only" and
that

the

closing date

after

satisfaction

of the

buildability

condition was the closing date intended by the partiesl.

JEd. at

1387.
These issues are substantially different from those presented
by Fehlauer to the trial court.
that

the

adjoining

property

The express condition precedent

be

sold

by

July

6 had

occurred

substantially before the date Fehlauer was required to close on
August 13, 1993.

No question of ambiguity existed as to the date

by which the condition precedent must have occurred or the date
that Fehlauer was obligated to close.
In Walker v. Feiring, 632 P.2d 1270 (Or. Ct. App.' 1981) the
court considered a situation where a single seller had agreed to
sell five lots to a buyer for use in a single multi-family complex.
The transaction was arranged so that two of the lots would be sold
through two different intermediate buyers and then resold to the
same ultimate buyer as the other three parcels in the same closing.
A dispute developed in the course of closing which prevented the
closing from occurring on the date specified.

The seller took the

position that he was relieved from his obligation tp sell but
agreed to allow the sale of the two lots to the intermediate buyers
and then to the ultimate buyer.
The

court

in considering

this

situation

relied upon

the

principle that a time limit in a contract may be waived by the
parties.

Id.

at

1272.

The

court

found

that

the

seller's

toleration of the buyer's late performance of two contracts in a
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"package of contracts" should be considered a waiver of the buyer's
timely performance with respect to the entire package. Id.
The Walker case presents a substantially different situation
than Fehlauer presented to the trial court.

The trial court never

considered a claim of waiver and never made findings of fact or
conclusions of law as to whether Schwartz had waived the express
condition precedent. Further, Schwartz's sale of the three parcels
and the contract with Fehlauer was not a "package."

In Walker, the

contracts were made with the same ultimate buyers, at the same
time, provided for the same closing date, and required closing
through the same agent.

632 P. 2d 1271. Schwartz made his contract

with the Madsen's a full month before the Fehlauer contract and
required separate closing dates more than a month apart.

The

contracts were made with two separate buyers who had no intention
of using the properties as a joint development.
intended

to

residences.

use

the

properties

for

separate

Indeed, both
and

distinct

Further, the inclusion of the express condition in the

Fehlauer contract evidenced the separate treatment the parties
intended

for

the

Madsen

and

Fehlauer

transactions.

These

circumstances do not present evidence sufficient to substantiate a
waiver by Schwartz of the condition precedent.

C.

Fehlauer's Interpretation that the Sale Occurred on May 30
Gives no Effect to the Condition Precedent Requiring the Sale
Before July 6.
Even though Fehlauer specifically attempted

to amend his

complaint seven days before trial to include a cause of action for
reformation and even though the trial court made a specific decree
S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim)
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in the judgment that the condition precedent should be reformed
(Record at 173) and supported that decree with a conclusion of law
(Record at 171), Fehlauer now attempts to explain the conclusion of
law as a way for the trial court to emphasize the term "sale" in
the condition precedent.

Fehlauer argues that the date of the

Madsen contract, May 20, was the date of the "sale" referred to in
the express condition precedent of the Fehlauer contract.

This

interpretation is not supported by the facts and would result in
making the condition precedent meaningless.
At trial, Fehlauer did not contend that the term "sale" in the
condition precedent had any meaning other than a closing of the
Madsen contract. The closing required a conveyance of the property
by Schwartz to Madsen and payment of the purchase price by Madsen
to Schwartz.

Indeed, the Findings of Fact assumed that the sale

did not occur until Madsen had paid the purchase price and Schwartz
had conveyed the property.

Findings of Fact 10 and 16.

Record at

165-66.
Schwartz and Fehlauer entered their contract on June 25, 1993
more than a month after the date of the Madsen contract on May 20,
1993.

Yet,

Schwartz

and

Fehlauer

expressly

conditioned

Fehlauer contract on the sale of the Madsen property.

the

If the

parties intended the "sale" of the Madsen property to have occurred
on May 20, 1993, then no reason existed for the parties to include
the express condition precedent in the Fehlauer contract.

The

condition would have already been satisfied at the time they
entered the Fehlauer contract on June 25, 1993.
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Under fundamental rules of contract interpretation,

"each

contract provision is to be considered in relation to all others
with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none."

Utah

Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981).

The

interpretation now advocated by Fehlauer would render the express
condition meaningless.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the trial
court and enter judgment in favor of Schwartz because, even taking
the evidence presented solely by Fehlauer at trial, the express
condition precedent to Schwartz's obligations was not satisfied or
excused.

Alternatively, the Court of Appeals should remand the

case to the trial court for a new trial at a time that Schwartz may
attend, testify on his own behalf and assist his counsel.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

o

day of February, 1995.

KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Robert G. Holt
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

that

two

copies

of

the

foregoing

instrument were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this
day of February, 1995, to the following:
H. James Clegg
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

A^/j^
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ADDENDUM

Tabl

ROBERT G. HOLT (#1531)
H. JAMES CLEGG (A0681)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
BROWN & GEE
Atttrn-y" for Plaintiff
Attorneys for Defendant ,>i0—"fj- i "j pf Q 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
185 South State Street, Suite 1300" ' *""
Post Office Box 450
45000
P.O. Box 11019
. . Q 4994 Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Aw> ' u l 7
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
,c erK0,bUmmrt^unty
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
C. STEVEN FEHLAUER,
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
WHEN NO REPORT WAS MADE

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 930312024 CN

THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ,
Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following statement
of proceedings shall be included by the Clerk of the Court in the record on appeal:
A.

Statement of Proceedings at Scheduling Conference held March 28. 1994.
The Court conducted a scheduling conference by telephone on March 28, 1994.

Present on the telephone conference call were H. James Clegg, counsel for plaintiff, and
Janet A. Goldstein, counsel for defendant.

3C:::RR^3: 470
0002iu

The following are counsel's recollections of relevant events concerning the
scheduling of this cause for trial. Where counsel's recollections differ, they are set forth
in bold type.
Based on the recollection of counsel, supported by affidavits, the following
proceedings occurred:
Mr. Schwartz's legislative candidacy was discussed. Ms. Goldstein stated that
defendant, Mr. Schwartz, was running for the Massachusetts State Legislature and that he
could not leave Massachusetts until after the election, which would be held in June. She
advised that Mr. Schwartz would be able to try the case in Utah in July, 1994. The
primary election date of May 10, 1994 was not mentioned.
Mr. Clegg recalls Ms. Goldstein stating that Mr. Schwartz would be free in
mid-June but Ms. Goldstein had a trial scheduled then that would take her into July.
Mr. Clegg objected that the plaintiff, Dr. Fehlauer, would lose the entire
construction year.
Mr. Clegg recalls that the Court said a trial scheduled for the week of April 4,
1994 would not occur and this time would be available; a setting during the week of
April 4, 1994 was acceptable to plaintiff, but not to defendant.
The Court suggested the week of May 9, 1994 for trial. Ms. Goldstein stated that
her client, Mr. Schwartz, would be unavailable on those dates because of his campaign.
She had particular objection to May 12 as she had scheduled an MCLE on insurance for
that day.

The Court concluded the scheduling conference by setting the trial date for May 10
and 11, 1994.

B.

Statement of Proceedings at Pretrial Scheduling Conference Held on April 26. 1994
The Court conducted a pretrial scheduling conference at the Summit County

Courthouse in Coalville, Utah, on April 26, 1994. Present were H. James Clegg for
plaintiff and Janet A. Goldstein for defendant.
Based on the recollection of counsel the following proceedings occurred:
Mr. Clegg recalls the Court suggesting all available dates in either Coalville or
Salt Lake City to and including June 28, for trial. The Court suggested June 28,
1994, even though it would be inconvenient for the Court and Mr. Clegg because of
their required attendance at Judicial Council and Bar Commission meetings at Sun
Valley on June 29, 1994.
Ms. Goldstein stated that a letter from the town clerk of Douglas, Massachusetts,
stated that her client, Mr. Schwartz, would be required to attend legislative sessions during
that time if he won the May 10 and June 11 elections. Ms. Goldstein stated that, in the
event Mr. Schwartz lost either of the elections, June 28 would be an acceptable date but
that, until the elections were held, it was not possible to commit to a date certain.
After further discussing the May 10 primary, the Court suggested Mr. Schwartz
could participate in the primary on Tuesday, May 10, 1994, and travel to Coalville to
prepare with his counsel, Ms. Goldstein, on May 11, 1994, and the morning of May 12,
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1994, so that the trial could begin at 1:30 p.m. on May 12, 1994. Ms. Goldstein believed
such a schedule would be unrealistic.
Ms. Goldstein advised the Court that her client, Mr. Schwartz, could not be
available on May 13 because it was right after his primary election and fewer than three
weeks before the special election. Ms. Goldstein told the Court that she would need at
least two full days with her client, Mr. Schwartz, to prepare for trial and that she had
previously committed to attending a continuing legal education seminar on May 12.
The Court concluded that the trial would be held as scheduled on May 10-11, 1994.
DATED this /(/

day of August, 1994.

$ *

norable David 5. Young
District Court Judge
Approved:

% ^

•

# > COUNTY / c

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
'"'Milling

H/Jamds Clegg
Attorneys for Plaintiff
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Robert G. Holt
Attorneys for Defendant
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